C ognitive theory associates vulnerability to psychopathology with the tendency to misappraise situations or events. Such misappraisals are predicated on the enduring and maladaptive nature of individuals' cognitive-affective structures, or schemas. For instance, while Beck (1976) described depression as resulting from a triad of negative views of self, the world, and the future, others have invoked terms such as "internal working models" of self and other and assumptions about the world in their explanations of a range of disorders (e.g., Bowlby, 1973; Guidano & Liotti, 1983; Janoff-Bulman, 1991) . However, few researchers have investigated the relationship between such broad structures and beliefs and vulnerability to the symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD; e.g., Bhar & Kyrios, 2000; Guidano & Liotti, 1983; Sookman, Pinard, & Beauchemin, 1994) .
OCD is one of the most incapacitating of the anxiety disorders (World Health Organization, 1996) . It is characterized by the occurrence of unwanted and disturbing intrusive thoughts, images, or impulses (obsessions) and compulsive acts/rituals aimed at reducing distress or preventing feared events from occurring (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) .
Cognitive-behavioral models are based on findings that clinical and nonclinical populations experience similar intrusive thoughts, images, or urges and associated cognitions (de Silva & Rachman, 1998; Salkovskis, 1985) . While nonclinical populations experience intrusions, people presenting with OCD display extreme reactions to such intrusions resulting in obsessive-compulsive (OC) symptoms. Such extreme reactions are associated with a range of dysfunctional beliefs and maladaptive appraisals that also lead to ineffective strategies in the management of intrusions.
Cognitive-behavioral research by the Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG, 1997) has focused on six main belief domains underlying these appraisals: responsibility, overimportance of thoughts, the need to control thoughts, overestimation of threat, intolerance for uncertainty, and perfectionism. These beliefs have been found to be associated with OCD, although a considerable amount of the variance of OCD symptoms remains unexplained (e.g., OCCWG, 2005; for reviews, see Clark, 2004; Frost & Steketee, 2002) . Implicit within these OC-relevant cognitive domains are beliefs about one's surrounding world (e.g., possible presence of danger) and about oneself (e.g., being personally responsible for preventing harm). A variety of variables related to self and worldviews have been linked with OC phenomena (e.g., sensitive sense of self, ambivalent sense of self, and magical thinking). However, a systematic examination of such self and worldview constructs in OCD is yet to be undertaken. Janoff-Bulman (1989 , 1991 proposed an influential worldview model that draws together previously disparate research regarding views of the world (e.g., beliefs in a just world, beliefs in response outcomes) with views of the self (e.g., evaluations of self-esteem and self-actions). The model regards individuals' perceptions of the world as comprising three analytically distinct aspects: (a) the perceived benevolence of the world, (b) the meaningfulness of the world, and (c) the worthiness of self (see Figure 1) . The first aspect, benevolence of the world, reflects assumptions regarding the degree to which individuals judge their social world as helpful and caring and their impersonal world as a positive or a negative environment.
The Multidimensional Worldview Model
The second aspect concerns beliefs regarding the nature and meaningfulness of the world. These beliefs are expressed within the individual's understanding of "who gets what" in the world and center around notions of consistency and predictability. This aspect of the model describes a world-controllability belief, justice belief, and a randomness belief. The worldcontrollability belief provides predictability through preventive actions (i.e., "misfortune can be prevented through action"), similar to Bandura's (1997) justice belief provides predictability through the individual's moral character, where people's moral constitution is assumed to predict consequences in the world (i.e., "if I am good, good things will happen"). In contrast, the randomness belief suggests there is no predictability in the world. The third aspect of Janoff-Bulman's (1989 , 1991 ) model pertains to the individual's evaluation of his or her self-worth. While world-controllability and justice beliefs refer to what is expected for all individuals, the worthiness-of-self category refers to the individual's evaluation of what he or she deserves in the world. This aspect is explained through the assumptions of self-controllability, self-deservingness, and self-luck. Self-controllability pertains to whether individuals regard themselves as active in the prevention of misfortune, self-deservingness relates to individuals' perceptions of their own character, and self-luck refers to the extent that individuals perceive themselves as being lucky 1 . Janoff-Bulman argued that individuals' appraisals of vulnerability in the world depends on self-evaluation in the context of their worldview assumptions. Janoff-Bulman (1989 , 1991 suggested that an understanding of personal theories of the world could facilitate a better understanding of individual's vulnerability to psychopathology. Research has suggested that emotional reactions to a range of stressful and traumatic events may be related to such prior beliefs and basic assumptions, which may be triggered or altered following stressful experiences (e.g., Boelen, Kip, Voorsluijs, & van den Bout, 2004; 1989; Kaiser, Vick, & Major, 2004) . Individuals' views of the world have been linked to vulnerability to a range of disorders (e.g., posttraumatic stress disorder). Investigating beliefs about the self and the world may contribute to a better understanding of the differences in the cognitive vulnerabilities to different types of psychopathology. 
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OCD and the Multidimensional Worldview Model
The concept of worldview is implied in cognitive behavioral theories of OCD. Although previously identified OC-relevant dysfunctional beliefs (OCCWG, 1997) may play an important role in the development and maintenance of OC symptoms, such dysfunctional beliefs do not account fully for negative interpretations of intrusions or the associated dysfunctional responses. For instance, Taylor et al. (2006) found that only 50% of their OCD patients scored higher than the control groups on measures of the beliefs identified by OCCWG, while Tolin, Worhunsky, and Maltby (2006) found that only beliefs about the importance and control of thoughts were specific to OCD patients relative to other anxiety groups. Identification of additional cognitive structures relevant to OCD may further our understanding of why OCD develops in some individuals but not in others (Steketee et al., 2002) and facilitate more focused treatments. Further, examining the interaction between beliefs about the self and the world may provide a more complete understanding of the cognitive rationale for obsessions and compulsions. Indeed, recent research has identified aspects of self-concept (for review, see Doron & Kyrios, 2005) and world perceptions (e.g., control; see Moulding & Kyrios, 2006 ) that may play an important role in the dynamic of OCD. Doron and Kyrios (2005) proposed that enduring cognitive-affective structures, consisting of particular structures of self, coupled with specific beliefs about the world, may underlie vulnerability to OCD. According to this model, vulnerability to intrusions is determined by a self-concept comprised of several highly valued domains within which the individual does not feel competent (i.e., "sensitive domains"; see Doron, Kyrios, & Moulding, 2007) . As a result, the individual is highly sensitive to intrusive thoughts or their appraisals when they suggest failure in sensitive self-domains. Particular assumptions about the world may then engender neutralizing behaviors in response to intrusions. For example, individuals who believe that harmful consequences are contingent on personal moral inadequacies and averted by personal efforts may be more likely to engage in neutralization compared to those who believe that danger is random and unavoidable. Therefore, according to this model, sensitivity to OCD is related not only to beliefs about self-worth but also to beliefs about the world and the extent to which negative outcomes are contingent on one's internal qualities and actions.
Several other variables relating to self and the world have already been linked to OC phenomena. For instance, Newth and Rachman (2001) argued that the concealment of symptoms commonly seen in OCD is due primarily to a fear of negative evaluation from others. Anticipated negative reactions from others to the content of unwanted intrusions and other OCD symptoms decrease the possibility for normalization, leading to increased distress and resulting in more frequent use of neutralizing strategies (Newth & Rachman, 2001) . Consistent with this, Bhar and Kyrios (1999) found that perceiving others as having unrealistic perfectionistic expectations of oneself (i.e., socially prescribed perfectionism) predicted unique variance in OC tendencies when controlling for depression in a nonclinical community sample. Thus, OC phenomena may be associated with negative appraisals of the benevolence of others.
Cognitive conceptualizations of OCD and its phenomenology suggest specific underlying assumptions about predictability (i.e., controllability beliefs) in the world and the importance of morality (i.e., justice beliefs). For instance, checking and washing symptoms imply the assumption that harm to self and others can be prevented through action (Moulding, Kyrios, & Doron, in press ). Indeed, the definition of responsibility as the individual's propensity to believe that they may be pivotally responsible for causing or failing to prevent harm (OCCWG, 1997) implies the presumption that harm is preventable and that one is able to prevent harm. In addition, the belief that the world is controllable through means such as magic, luck, and so forth has been linked to OC phenomena (Einstein & Menzies, 2004) . Assumptions about one's moral constitution and actions (i.e., being, acting, and thinking morally) are implied in OC-related beliefs, such as an inflated sense of personal responsibility (Salkovskis, 1985 (Salkovskis, , 1999 , exaggerated beliefs regarding the importance of controlling one's thoughts (Clark & Purdon, 1993) , and "catastrophic misinterpretations" of the personal significance of intrusive thoughts (Rachman, 1997 (Rachman, , 1998 . Thus, OC phenomena may be associated with increased assumptions about the consequence of one's moral constitution and actions such as the justice and controllability beliefs. OCD research could benefit from further evaluation of different aspects of self-perception (Bhar & Kyrios, in press ; Clark, 2004; Rachman, 1998) . Rowa and Purdon (2003) found that the distress evoked by intrusive thoughts is related to the content of the intrusions and the individual's self-perceptions. Testing Rachman's proposal that obsessions reveal important and hidden elements of one's identity, Ferrier and Brewin (2005) reported that, compared to anxiety and normal controls, individuals with OCD were more likely to draw negative inferences about themselves from their experiences of having intrusions. While anxiety controls showed a "feared self " characterized by fearfulness and hopelessness, those with OCD reported a "feared self " characterized as dangerous to self or others by virtue of being bad, immoral, or insane. Bhar and Kyrios (in press) found that individuals presenting with OCD scored significantly higher on a measure of self ambivalence compared to nonclinical university students and community controls.
Consistent with such findings, low perceptions of one's own moral constitution may increase the likelihood of being distressed by the experience of intrusive thoughts. Such vulnerability to intrusive thoughts may be amplified by the belief that consequences in the world are determined by moral deservingness (i.e., people get what they morally deserve in the world). Similarly, individuals who assume that misfortune in the world is avoidable may be more susceptible to act on perceived danger related to intrusive thoughts (e.g., being contaminated), in particular when holding the belief that their own actions are useful in the prevention of harm (e.g., washing). This may increase the likelihood of using neutralizing behaviors (Salkovskis, 1985) . Thus, aspects of self-evaluation and world assumptions may increase sensitivity to OC symptoms.
In sum, a systematic multidimensional examination of self and world beliefs may advance our understanding of OCD by examining more general and potentially important aspects of self and worldview. These more general beliefs need to be considered in the context of the specific cognitive styles proposed by current cognitive-behavioral theories. Establishing the relative importance of worldview assumptions in predicting OC symptoms over and above variables previously shown to be important in OCD is the first step in such an investigation.
THE PRESENT STUDY
The review given here implies that the examination of more general and potentially important aspects of self and worldview may advance our understanding of OCD. First, following from the research outlined previously, it was hypothesized that OC-related cognitions (e.g., overestimation of threat, perfectionism, and control of thoughts) would moderately relate to one's assumptions about the world. Second, it was hypothesized that OC severity scores would be predicted by worldview assumptions. Specifically, OC severity was expected to be predicted by an increase in perceptions that (a) the world is fair (i.e., world justice), (b) harm can be avoided in the world (i.e., world controllability), and (c) one is active in the prevention of harm (i.e., self-controllability). OC severity was also expected to be predicted by (d) negative self worth (i.e., self-deservingness) and (e) negative perceptions of others (i.e., negative benevolence of world assumption). In addition, two interaction effects were expected. Negative assessment of self-deservingness was expected to further increase OC symptoms in the context of high justice beliefs (i.e., "I am not a good person," coupled with beliefs that "good things happen to good people"). Moreover, positive assessment of self-controllability was expected to further increase OC severity in the context of high world-controllability beliefs (i.e., "through our actions we can prevent bad things happening," coupled with "I take action to prevent misfortune"). Finally, it was hypothesized that this worldview model would predict OC severity scores over and above currently acknowledged OC-related cognitions. While current models implicate worldview beliefs, the use of a more general worldview model would allow for an assessment of beliefs that are relevant to OCD but that are beyond the scope of current measures of OCD-relevant cognitions.
METHOD Participants
The present study included 167 participants ( M age = 19.9; SD = 5.2; range = 17-57 years; 83% female). The majority of participants were born in Australia (60.8%) and Asia (31.3%). Participants were first-year undergraduate psychology students who received course credit for participation. The use of nonclinical populations within research into OCD is a common practice (e.g., Coles, Frost, Heimberg, & Rheaume, 2003; Tolin, Woods, & Abramowitz, 2006 ) . Such studies are based on findings that nonclinical populations experience similar intrusive thoughts to clinical populations (e.g., Purdon, 2001; Rachman & de Silva, 1978) . As such, cognitive models of OCD follow dimensional models of beliefs and symptoms (e.g., Salkovskis, 1985) .
Measures
The World Assumption Scale (WAS; Janoff-Bulman, 1991; see Figure 1 for examples of items) is a 36-item self-report measure of vulnerability-related beliefs about the benevolence and meaningfulness of the world and about self-worthiness. The WAS consists of seven subscales corresponding to the beliefs in Janoff-Bulman's model: the benevolence of the world scale, 2 including items relating to benevolence of people and the benevolence of the impersonal world ("good things in the world outnumber the bad" and "people are naturally unfriendly and unkind"); the justice scale with items relating to the extent of "fairness" in the world ("misfortune is least likely to strike worth, decent people"); the world-controllability 3 scale with items relating to the degree our peoples' actions determine consequences in the world ("through our action we can prevent bad things from happening to us"); the randomness scale with items relating to the degree of random occurrences in the world ("bad events are distributed to people at random"); the selfdeservingness scale with items relating to one's perceptions of their own personal character ("I have reason to be ashamed of my personal character"); the self-controllability scale with items relating to individuals' perceptions of their own activeness in the prevention of harm ("I take the actions necessary to protect myself against misfortune"); and the luck scale with items pertaining to the one's own perceptions of how lucky they are ("I am luckier than most people"). Statements are rated on a six-point scale, where 1 = strongly agree and 6 = strongly. Factor analysis of the items supported the independence of the seven original subscales (Janoff-Bulman, 1989 , 1991 .
The Padua Inventory-Revised (PI-R; Burns, Keortge, Formea, & Sternberger, 1996 ) is a 39-item inventory measuring the degree of disturbance caused by a range of intrusive thoughts and compulsive behaviors. It has been widely used in OCD research (OCCWG, 2001 (OCCWG, , 2003 (OCCWG, , 2005 and exhibits adequate reliability and validity.
The Revised Obsessive Belief Questionnaire (OBQ; OCCWG, 2005) is a 44-item self-report measure of pan-situational cognitions associated with OCD developed by the OCCWG. Factor analysis of the OBQ has identified three domains: (a) threat/responsibility, (b) perfectionism/ need for certainty, and (c) importance/control of thoughts. The scale demonstrates satisfactory internal consistency, good convergent validity, modest divergent validity, and moderate-to-high test-retest reliability. 
Procedure
The student participants completed the questionnaires in a random order in a classroom within the department.
RESULTS
Analysis was performed using SPSS 14.0. For three cases in which participants did not complete all relevant questionnaires, questionnaire scores were replaced with means. Assumptions of normality, linearity, and homoscedascity were met. In order to decrease multicollinearity, all relevant WAS subscales were centered (i.e., put in deviation score form) and interaction terms formed by multiplying together the two relevant centered predictors (Aiken & West, 1991) . All scales exhibited adequate internal consistency, except randomness and luck (Cronbach's α = .63 and .69, respectively), which were consequently excluded from analyses (see Table 1 ). The mean OCD symptom score in this sample was comparable to those in other Australian student samples (see Table 1 ) (Einstein & Menzies, 2004 , Scarrabelotti, Duck, & Dickerson, 1995 . A series of analysis of variance tests were employed to examine gender differences on WAS subscales. No differences were found except for males showing higher self-deservingness scores F(1, 166) = 5.66, p < .01.
In order to examine the relationship between world assumptions and OC-related cognitions, zero-order correlations between the worldview and OC beliefs were examined (see Table 2 ). Small to medium zero-order correlations were found between the constructs, suggesting that worldview assumptions and OC-related beliefs are related but not redundant constructs. Specifically, negative perceptions of the benevolence of the world (i.e., personal/impersonal) and positive assumptions regarding the predictability of the world (i.e., justice and world controllability) were associated with higher levels of OC cognitions. Negative perceptions of self-deservingness were also associated with higher OC cognitions. Self-controllability and luck did not show significant relationships with most OC cognitions.
In order to test whether world assumptions predict OC severity scores, a hierarchical linear regression was undertaken to predict the PI-R total score.
The regression was conducted according to the following sequence of entering blocks. First, the WAS subscales were entered (benevolence of world, justice, world controllability, self-deservingness, self-controllability, and luck), followed by the two interaction terms (i.e., justice*self-deservingness and world controllability*self-controllability). Table 3 presents a summary of the regression statistics for this analysis. 4 The overall model explained 33% of the variance, F (7, 160) = 11.08, p < .001. Greater levels of justice beliefs and self-controllability and lower endorsement of the benevolence of world and the self as deserving were each significantly predictive associated with higher OC symptoms.
TABLE 1. MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS (SD), AND INTERNAL CONSISTENCY (CRONBACH'S α) FOR SCALES
The addition of the two interaction terms explained an additional 9% of the variance, F change (7, 160) = 10.61, p < .001. The two interaction terms were analyzed using simple slope analysis (see Aiken & West, 1991) . An increase in self-deservingness scores predicted a significant decrease in OC severity scores, β = -.18, t (160) = 4.68, p < .001, for participants scoring high on the justice scale (1 SD above the mean) but not for participants scoring low on the justice scale (1 SD below the mean), β = .00, t (160) = 0.023, p > .05. Note. WAS = World Assumption Scale, OBQ = Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire, Threat/resp. = overinflated threat/responsibility subscale, Perfect./uncert. = perfectionism/uncertainty subscale, Imp. Th. = importance of/need to control thoughts subscale.
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*p < .05. **p < .01.
TABLE 3. SUMMARY OF HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR WAS VARIABLES PREDICTING OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE SYMPTOMS
PI-R-Total
Step A similar pattern of results for the self-controllability and world-controllability interactions was found. Increased self-controllability scores predicted a significant increase in OC severity scores for participants scoring high on world controllability, β = .17, t (160) = -3.70, p < .001, but not for participants scoring low on world controllability, β = 0.02, t (160) = 0.40, p > .05.
In order to test whether a multidimensional model of worldview would add to the prediction of OC symptoms over and above OC-related beliefs, a hierarchical linear regression was undertaken with the PI-R total as the dependent variable. 6 The regression was conducted according to the following sequence of entering blocks. First, the total score of the OBQ total scores was entered. This was done in order to control for OC-related belief scores using a regression format (Tabachnik & Fidell, 1996 ) . Next, the WAS variables were entered, followed by the two interaction terms in the final step (see Table 4 ).
The overall model explained 53% of the variance, F (8, 159) = 21.89, p < .001. Worldview assumptions and the interaction terms explained 14% of the variance over and above OC-related cognitions (see Table 4 ). Beliefs relating to negative benevolence of the world were associated with higher OCD severity over and above scores on the OBQ. The two interaction terms significantly predicted OC severity. A simple slope analysis revealed the same patterns of interaction as in the previous analysis. That is, an increase in self-deservingness scores led to a statistically significant decrease in OC severity scores for participants scoring high on the justice scale, β = -.13, t (159) = -4.00, p < .001, but not for participants scoring low on the justice scale, β = .04, t (159) = 1.48, p > .05.
Similarly, increased self-controllability scores led to a significant increase in OC severity scores for participants scoring high on the world-controllability scale, β = .12, t (159) = 3.00,
TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR WAS VARIABLES PREDICTING OCD SYMPTOMS WHEN CONTROLLING FOR OCD-RELEVANT BELIEFS
PI-R-Total
Step 1 (OBQ p < .01, but not for participants scoring low on world controllability, β = -.05, t (159) = -1.27, p > .05. Finally, in order to further clarify the relationship between OC-related cognitions, OC symptoms, and worldview variables, we tested to what extent OC-related cognitions add to the prediction of OC-related symptoms when controlling for self and world beliefs. In order to do this, an additional hierarchical linear regression was undertaken with the PI-R total as the dependent variable. In this regression, the WAS variables were entered first, followed by the two interaction terms. The OBQ total scores was entered in the final step. As can be seen in Table 5 , when entered first, worldview assumptions and the interaction terms explained 33% of the variance of OC symptom severity. Total OBQ scores explained 20% of the variance over and above worldview assumptions.
DISCUSSION
In this study, it was proposed that a multifaceted examination of worldview would expand current cognitive conceptualizations of OC phenomena by identifying additional OC-relevant beliefs and by demonstrating interactions between general views about the nature of the world and particular perceptions of the self in the prediction of OC symptom severity. Consistent with the hypotheses, assumptions regarding the self, the world, and others were found to relate to OC cognitions and predicted OC symptoms. Worldview assumptions were also found to significantly predict OCD severity over and above the OC-related cognitions described in current cognitive-behavioral models. Indeed, an overall model consisting of worldview assumptions and OC-related cognitions predicted over half the variance in OC severity scores. World
TABLE 5. SUMMARY OF HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR OCD-RELEVANT BELIEFS PREDICTING OCD SYMPTOMS WHEN CONTROLLING FOR WAS VARIABLES
PI-R-Total
Step 1 assumptions predicted 14% of the variance over and above beliefs previously found to be associated with OCD. Moreover, OC-related cognitions predicted less than would be expected (20%) of the variance over and above world assumptions. This suggests that cognitive models of OCD may benefit from acknowledging the role of more general worldview variables in the development of OCD. Specifically, a number of worldview assumptions were found to relate to OC symptoms. Greater endorsement of the belief that justice operates in the world (i.e., good things happen to good people) was associated with higher OC symptoms, particularly when the individual believed him-or herself to be nondeserving. Similarly, higher levels of the belief that the self is active in preventing misfortune (i.e., self-controllability beliefs) were associated with higher OC symptoms, particularly when the individual perceived actions to be effective in preventing harm (i.e., world controllability). Finally, lower levels of self-deservingness and negative perceptions of the world were associated with significantly higher OCD symptom severity.
Examination of zero-order correlations with the OBQ suggested that these world beliefs are somewhat related to other OC-relevant beliefs. In particular, beliefs regarding predictability in the world (i.e., world controllability and justice) were positively related to the OBQ dimensions. In addition, when predicting OC symptoms, OC-related cognitions predicted 20% of the variance over and above world assumption variables. One interpretation of such findings is that world beliefs may partially underlie other OCD-related beliefs (e.g., one should be responsible in preventing harm if good things happen to good people; one can be responsible for preventing harm only if actions can effectively prevent harm from occurring in the world). Alternatively, individuals with more negative views of the world and of themselves may be more likely to hold OC-relevant beliefs, perhaps because such beliefs represent the individual trying to do "right" to compensate for the negative representations of the world and self. Future research will need to examine the nature of the association between these beliefs.
That only small correlations were found between self-controllability and the threat/responsibility scale of the OBQ was unexpected given the similarity in definitions of the two constructs (e.g., responsibility refers to a belief that one is pivotal in preventing harm, whereas selfcontrollability refers to perceptions of self as active in preventing harm). Salkovskis and Freeston (2001) have, however, noted that individuals may feel responsibility even though they "may not be able to influence the event in the way they would like" (p. 4). Other research has also found control beliefs to differ from beliefs surrounding responsibility (Moulding et al., in press) . Thus, worldview beliefs may extend our understanding of the functional role of OC-relevant beliefs in OCD. These findings suggest that we might reach a more complete understanding of OCD from further examination of the relationship of traditional beliefs with wider worldview assumptions.
Despite the correlations between worldviews and other OC-relevant beliefs, world beliefs were also found to predict OC symptoms over and above the OBQ. Negative views of the benevolence of the world and the interaction effects remained significant when controlling for other variables. This further suggests that inclusion of world beliefs adds to current models of OCD, although our results are not inconsistent with prior research and theory (e.g., Clark & Purdon, 1993; Ehntholt, Salkovskis, & Rimes, 1999; Rachman, 1997) . For example, Guidano and Liotti (1983) suggested that OC phenomena are characterized by perceptions of social and physical threat coupled with a view of the world as controllable. Such perceptions of the environment are thought to stem from early experiences such as attachment relationships. Our results support Guidano and Liotti's proposal insofar as they indicate that perceiving the world as a predictable place where misfortune is avoidable and where one's moral character and actions bear future consequences leads to increased sensitivity to OC phenomena. Similarly, these findings are consistent with those of Wroe, Salkovskis, and Richards (2000) , who suggested that the presence of an intrusive thought signifying harm is perceived to be significant because it is interpreted as indicating personal agency in preventing action, and with the position of Moulding and Kyrios (2006; Moulding & Kyrios, in press ; Moulding et al., in press ) that individuals with OCD are more likely to desire to control situations in response to intrusive thoughts, leading to actions to reduce threat.
Thus, individuals who assume that misfortune can be avoided through action may be more susceptible to act on danger-related intrusive thoughts. Further, perceiving others as uncaring and unkind was also found to increase OC vulnerability. This may be particularly relevant for individuals with "shameful intrusions" (Newth & Rachman, 2001) . The perception that outcomes depend on justice and of oneself as nondeserving may lead one to act in response to intrusions in an effort to perceive oneself as "good" or "moral" and avoid being "bad" or "immoral" (Bhar & Kyrios, 2000; Guidano & Liotti, 1983; Purdon & Clark, 1999) . Examination of wider assumptions about the world may thus further our understanding of OC phenomena by outlining a more detailed relationship between self, worldview, and traditional OC-relevant cognitions.
The present findings that worldview may constitute a vulnerability to OC symptoms has potential implications for cognitive therapy. In particular, questioning and challenging individuals' negative self-evaluations with respect to their own actions and moral deservingness, their views regarding the benevolence of people, and their perceptions of the predictability of the world may be useful in alleviating OC symptoms. For example, testing beliefs that harm in the world is determined by one's moral "purity" or that one has the capacity to always prevent misfortune, together with challenging assumptions regarding individuals' "undeservingness," may help to reduce sensitivity to intrusive thoughts as well as the need to act on or respond to intrusions.
As this is the first study to examine worldviews, these findings require further replication. In particular, as a large proportion of the sample was females, care should be taken when generalizing these findings to both genders. Further research should examine clinical cohorts with OCD to determine the generalizability of these findings. Analogue participants experience OC-related phenomena and associated cognitions but differ from clinical patients in severity and symptomrelated impairment. In addition, assessment of the relationship between world assumptions, depressive symptoms, and general anxiety would enable a better understanding of the specificity of the relationships between worldview variables and OC symptoms.
The cross-sectional nature of this study does not enable us to determine causal relations between the measured variables. It is possible that worldview variables result from OC symptoms and OC-relevant beliefs. Future prospective and experimental studies are necessary to more clearly elucidate the causal nature of the associations. Finally, care should be taken when applying these results to other cultural contexts, as factors associated with OC phenomena may differ across cultures (e.g., Fontenelle, Mendlowicz, Marques, & Versiani, 2004; Sica, Novara, Sanavio, Dorz, & Coradeschi, 2002) .
In sum, this study involved a systematic investigation of the link between worldview assumptions and OC phenomena. The results suggest that world assumptions are associated with OC symptom severity and that this association cannot be fully accounted for by beliefs implicated in current models of OCD. In particular, a focus on "just-world" beliefs may be an important addition to theories of OCD given the moral nature of most obsessions. Following replication, these findings may have important implications with respect to providing coherence across different cognitive theories and, as a result, improving treatment for those affected by OCD.
NOTES
